Dear Sir, We read your perceptive editorial [3] on our paper BSide errors in neurosurgery and human factors training^ [4] with interest. We would value the opportunity to respond and to clarify some of the issues raised.
The training intervention was led by one of the authors (TD), not a doctor, but a retired senior Training Captain for a major airline with experience in training Human Factors since 1990 in aviation and 2002 in healthcare, especially surgery.
In aviation, checklists are used not just in routine situations but in ensuring correct compliance with complex non-normal or emergency situations as well, where the crew is of course in jeopardy and hence they have significant interest in compliance.
The course concentrated on theatre practice, typical errors, and their causes coupled with practical methods of error management. The trainers have many years' experience of coaching in live theatre and their non-clinical background helps them focus on non-clinical aspects of behaviors.
The course we ran explained the relevance of human factors to everyday working practice, and how and why human errors arise. Errors are minimized by managing overload, interruption and distraction, or poor design of equipment, systems, processes, or compliance with checklists. Without such training, the default response to errors is to allocate blame and exact punishment, an approach now known to be ineffective. In essence, very few errors are down to malice. Those who make errors are trying their best, often under challenging pressure and fatigue, and error is inevitable. Tools to manage, avoid, or trap errors exist, and were introduced.
The concept of Situational Awareness was at the core of the course since on this decisions are made. This is followed by communication skills, well honed in aviation and particularly assertiveness strategies for handling difficult conversations. Leadership skills, including emotional intelligence, are included, which leads to the vital skill of briefing the entire team, use of checklists, and concluding with a debriefing. Debriefing is a valuable tool in other industries but in health care a durable and effective format has yet to be finalized.
In the case of the subject site, a minority of senior clinicians were unwilling to take part in the training and coaching. Their view, not unusual in clinical practice, was that they did not need it, and checklists and briefings were a nuisance. These were cultural issues and are not uncommon across healthcare and not confined to theatres. Self-belief is necessary but not to the point of arrogance. This applies to aviation as well, an area with more effective evolutionary selection pressure against it! The training gave self-confidence to the rest of the theatre team and the ability to be firm in the face of intransigent behavior and obduracy, and insist on correct use of briefing and checklists. Ultimately, we believe this to be the root cause of success.
What is commendable is that the teams sustained their improved working practice when the training team departed, and it seems for a long period.
Regarding left-right dyspraxia, we should have been clearer in what this referred to. It is not the rare spatial apraxia associated with organic brain dysfunction such as Gerstmann's syndrome, but rather the more common psychological variant of not knowing left from right intuitively. Such people tell left from right by tricks such as noting which hand they write with or noting that the extended thumb and index finger of the left hand form an BL^. These tricks take cognitive effort and are vulnerable to error or omission when under stress. Operations in which both scrub nurse and surgeon have left-right dyspraxia are clearly at greater risk of side errors.
This kind of right-left dyspraxia or Bconfusion^is not rare, and affects 19-32 % of people [1, 2] , meaning that in our side error-free run of 25,812 operations, it is probable that there were 1,000-2,500 in which both surgeon and scrub nurse had the dyspraxia. The correct design and use of checklists is crucial, but it seems that compliance is sporadic at best in some theatres as evidenced by the high rate of Bnever-events^in the UK.
Regarding costing We did not place a cost on the cancellation of theatre lists in the paper, as this varies from department to department. We estimate that the cost in lost tariffs of canceling 4 days was approximately £40,000; and today would be approximately £50,000. The cost of theatre staff is now about £2,700 per 10-h list day (anesthetic consultant and registrar, three theatre staff, surgical consultant, and registrar) and this would reflect the true cost if the staff were trained but the theatre not left unused, as would be feasible where neurosurgery units are located in large hospitals (which was not the case for us when we ran the course). We therefore estimate that the total cost of the intervention was £85,000 and would be £60,000 to £100,000 if run now. We think the figure of £450,000 calculated in the editorial is too high, at least for the UK NHS.
Yours Sincerely, Patrick Mitchell; Trevor Dale Comment Safety should be a primary concern when conducting neurosurgery and we certainly feel that a number of complications and bad outcomes should be avoidable. The authors Trevor Dale and Patrick Mitchell have used a training program to increase awareness of avoidable factors, a program that provided tools to manage, trap, and avoid complications. They have now explained some issues at greater depth. The potential threat of "everyday right-left confusion" is an interesting pick-up and a potential explanation of many complications. Reproducibility is a cornerstone of scientific publication; for a reader, more detailed data on the actual tools would be helpful in order to reproduce the work, and it is inherently difficult to assess the success of a training program that aims at avoiding very rare events; any statistical evaluation would require evaluation of enormous numbers of cases. I believe that this very ambitious program was successful, but the figures are not unequivocal. Of course, it is troublesome to run a safety-awareness program in an environment where optout can be based on finding checklists and briefs Ba nuisance^. Checklists are perfect to structure certain knowledge and procedures and can help to avoid many mistakes. Sometimes, however, checklists, error reports, and non-specific training get too much attention and credit for safety. In aviation, transparent role play, very specific professional training, recertification, and selection procedures are also integral parts of maintaining safety at high levels.
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